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THE EFFECTS OF DISCLOSURE REGULATION 





A firm actively manages its rival’s beliefs by disclosing and concealing information on the 
size of its process innovation. The firm’s disclosure strategy results from the trade-off 
between two effects on product market incentives. First, the firm’s competitor learns that the 
firm is efficient, which discourages the competitor. Second, the competitor becomes more 
efficient himself, since he can expropriate part of the disclosed knowledge, which encourages 
him. I characterize the equilibrium disclosure strategies for any knowledge spillover in a 
simple Cournot duopoly model, and illustrate the results graphically. Moreover, I compare the 
strategic disclosure equilibria with equilibria under non-strategic disclosure. 
JEL Code: D82, L23, O31. 
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In many industries ﬁrms make announcements about their innovations. Preannounce-
ments are made in e.g. the information technology, biotechnology, pharmaceutical,
and car industries. Communication between ﬁr m sh a sp o t e n t i a ln e g a t i v ea n dp o s i t i v e
eﬀects on welfare.
Among the potential negative eﬀects of preannouncements is the possibility of
predation. For example, it is often claimed that Microsoft is using preannouncements
of its products (e.g. operating system upgrades, game console) to drive competition
out of its market.1 Disclosing good news about one’s own new product or production
process while hiding bad news, may discourage rivals to supply a competing product.
The potential anti-competitive eﬀects of Microsoft’s product preannouncements were
discussed during the 1994-95 licensing court case against Microsoft (e.g. see United
States v. Microsoft, Civil Action No. 94-1564). Although the judge recognized that
preannouncements may have anti-competitive eﬀects, no restrictions were placed on
Microsoft’s announcements.2
Second, ﬁrms can use communication to facilitate collusion. Detection of devi-
ations from collusive agreements is easier when ﬁrms frequently share information
related to their strategies. Kühn and Vives (1995) and Kühn (2001) carefully analyze
the conditions under which communication between ﬁrms is correlated with collusion,
and is unlikely to have eﬃciency beneﬁts. From these conditions, which are based on
economic theory, experiments and case studies, the papers derive simple policy rules
to ﬁght collusion by restricting communication between ﬁrms.
My paper studies the eﬀects of imposing a simple restriction on communication
between ﬁrms: the prohibition of precommitment to information sharing rules. Firms
may attempt to precommit to disclose or conceal their information through the es-
1See e.g. Lopatka and Page (1995), Prentice (1996), Shapiro (1996), and Shapiro and Varian
(1999). An anacdotical report on Microsoft’s strategies is presented in Wallace and Erickson (1992).
2Another case in which some eﬀects of product announcements were discussed occurred in the
period 1987-1991 when shareholders of Apple Computer brought securities fraud charges against the
company. Apple’s preannouncement of its Lisa computer and Twiggy disk drive and subsequent
extensive delay in delivery was alleged to violate Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the 1934 US
Securities Exchange Act (e.g. see Prentice and Langmore, 1994). The case was settled out of court.
1tablishment of a trade association, or the organization of frequent trade fares. If
precommitment is prohibited, then a ﬁrm can only make strategic, unilateral disclo-
sure choices, e.g. through the publication in scientiﬁc journals.
More drastic restrictions on communication between innovative ﬁrms may yield
welfare losses, since the following two potential eﬃciency gains would be foregone.
First, communication between competing ﬁrms may enhance allocative eﬃciency, since
it facilitates more eﬃcient decision-making in the product market. Kühn and Vives
(1995) give an overview of the potential positive proﬁta n dw e l f a r ee ﬀects. The as-
s u m p t i o n so fm ym o d e la r es u c ht h a tp o s i t i v ep r o ﬁta n dw e l f a r ee ﬀects emerge from
communication.
Second, a ﬁrm’s preannouncement can also reveal some valuable information about
the innovation’s contents to the competitor. When knowledge about the contents of
an innovation is revealed to a rival ﬁrm after disclosure, this enables the rival ﬁrm to
imitate, and become more eﬃcient himself. The improvement of productive eﬃciency
resulting from this expropriation eﬀect may be yet another reason for an antitrust
authority not to prohibit communication between innovative ﬁrms.
A preannouncing ﬁrm faces the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, the ﬁrm
creates a strategic advantage by revealing it is an eﬃcient, “aggressive” Cournot
competitor. On the other hand, the disadvantage of disclosure is that some of the
contents of the innovation spills over to the competitor, which enables him to catch
up. This expropriation eﬀect, which is central in most patent design literature (e.g.
see Scotchmer, 1991), reduces a ﬁrm’s incentive to disclose its innovation. While
the strategic eﬀect gives ﬁrms an incentive to disclose innovations, the expropriation
eﬀect encourages concealment of information. Gertner (1998, p. 608) makes a related
observation:
“Firm 1 may wish to convince Firm 2 that it has low costs to
induce Firm 2 to exit or produce less. If the only way to certify
this information is to reveal technological secrets that Firm 2
may be able to appropriate, disclosure is unlikely.”
2This paper illustrates the eﬀect of this trade-oﬀ on the innovative ﬁrm’s disclosure
strategy, and on the ﬁrms’ production incentives.
In particular, I compare the expected proﬁt of Cournot duopolists under precom-
mitment with the expected proﬁt under strategic disclosure. Under precommitment
t h ed i s c l o s u r er u l eo faﬁrm is ﬁxed before the ﬁrm learns the size of its innovation.
Under strategic disclosure an innovative ﬁrm learns the size of its process innovation,
and chooses strategically whether to disclose this information to its rival.
The paper, together with a companion paper Jansen (2005), attempts to contribute
to the literature on spillovers in oligopoly, and the literature on strategic information
disclosure. Whereas the current paper gives a simple graphical analysis of a model
with one-sided asymmetric information about discrete types, the companion paper
(Jansen, 2005) studies the problem of information disclosure among innovative ﬁrms
with two-sided asymmetric information about a continuum of types.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nt h ee ﬀects of spillovers in oligopoly is extensive, see e.g. d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992), and Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998). My
contribution to this literature is to study the eﬀects of spillovers in a setting with
asymmetric information. Anton and Yao (2003, 2004) study information disclosure
incentives of competing, innovative ﬁrms. These papers focus on separating equilibria
where, although ﬁrms do not disclose all information, the disclosed information is a
perfect signal of the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency.3 The amount of knowledge that is expected to
spill over to the rival determines a ﬁrm’s disclosure strategy. The size of the knowl-
edge spillover plays an important role in my analysis too. But in contrast to Anton
and Yao’s important results, I obtain equilibria that need not be fully revealing to
ﬁrms. An important diﬀerence between this paper and Anton and Yao is that I study
disclosure incentives of a ﬁrm with an indivisible innovation. Therefore, the only
choice of an innovative ﬁrm in this paper is between disclosure and concealment of
all information. A ﬁrm in Anton and Yao chooses how much information to disclose.
3Also Bayus et al. (2001) study a signalling model of preannouncements. In contrast to Anton
and Yao and my paper, the innovative ﬁrm attempts to deter entry by sending costly messages,
where the signal cost is exogenous.
3Furthermore, I perform proﬁt and welfare analyses, which are absent in Anton and
Yao.
Recently, Gill (2004) analyzed a related model, where an innovative ﬁrm strate-
gically discloses information related to its innovative eﬃciency and the size of the
innovation. This paper diﬀers in several respects from mine. Most importantly, Gill
studies R&D incentives, while I study product market incentives. On a technical
level Gill analyzes a model with discrete actions and a continuous types space, while
the present paper does the reverse, i.e. a continuous action space and a discrete
types space. That is, whereas Gill studies entry deterrence strategies, I focus on entry
accommodation strategies. Also Jansen (2004) studies a related problem. But, in con-
trast to the present paper, Jansen focuses on R&D incentives, and analyzes a model
with perfectly correlated types. This yields diﬀerent disclosure incentives. Both Gill
and Jansen obtain concealment of information for some parameter values.
Strategic preannouncements of innovations, have been analyzed in the ﬁelds of
law, marketing, and economics. One of the ﬁrst papers to point to the potential
strategic implications of preannouncements is Ordover and Willig (1981). Among the
contributions in economics are e.g. Farrell and Saloner (1986), Lopatka and Page
(1995), Levy (1997), Haan (2003), Dranove and Gandal (2003), Gerlach (2004), and
Choi et al. (2004). These papers typically study the eﬀects of preannouncements on
consumers’ beliefs and demand. The present paper focuses on the direct, strategic ef-
fects of information disclosure on a ﬁrm’s competitor, and the potential expropriation
of technological knowledge by a competitor.
Thereby the paper intends to contribute to the literature on information sharing
in oligopolistic markets. Most economics literature has focused on non-strategic infor-
mation sharing.4 My contribution to papers such as Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1986), and
Shapiro (1986) is to study the eﬀects of knowledge spillover on information sharing
incentives. I also give graphical illustrations of the main results. Moreover, I study
strategic disclosure incentives, and compare them with the incentives to precommit
4For instance, Kühn and Vives (1995), Raith (1996), and Vives (1999) contain recent surveys.
Jin (1995) studies the eﬀects of precommitment to announcements about product quality.
4to disclosure rules.
Strategic information disclosure is extensively studied in the accounting literature.5
But in this literature precommitment to disclosure rules is not often analyzed. An
important result in strategic disclosure analysis is the so-called “unraveling result”.
When it is known that the sender of information is informed, and there are no costs
of veriﬁcation or disclosure, then the sender can often not do better than disclose
his information, given skeptical equilibrium beliefs of the receiver. Papers by e.g.
Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), and Okuno-Fujiwara
et al. (1990) study this result. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. give suﬃcient conditions under
which the unraveling result applies. The suﬃcient condition that is violated in my
model is “positive-monotonicity of best response functions.” This violation, which
emerges in industries with positive knowledge spillovers, may cause a break-down of
t h eu n r a v e l i n gr e s u l t ,a sId e m o n s t r a t eb e l o w .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I describe the model. The
third section discusses the equilibrium outputs and proﬁts when the innovative ﬁrm
precommits to either disclose all cost information or none. Section 4 gives the equi-
librium outputs and disclosure choices when the innovative ﬁrm strategically discloses
information, and I compare expected proﬁts under precommitment with those under
strategic disclosure. Section 5 brieﬂy discusses some economic policy implications of
the analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs of the paper’s main
propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
Two ﬁrms, ﬁrms i and n, produce homogeneous goods. Firm i,t h ei n n o v a t i v eﬁrm,
has private information about its unit production cost, θi, which is either low, θi = θ,
with probability p,o rh i g h ,θi = θ, with probability 1 − p,w h e r e0 ≤ θ < θ and
0 <p<1.F i r m n is not innovative, and has a high unit production cost θn = θ.
Firm n’s marginal cost is common knowledge.
5For recent surveys on discretionary disclosure of proprietary information in the accounting lit-
erature, see e.g. Dye (2001), and Verrecchia (2001).
5After ﬁrm i learns its cost, it makes a disclosure choice. Firm i with cost θi
chooses the probability of disclosure δ(θi), i.e. with probability δ(θi) the ﬁrm reveals
its cost truthfully, while with probability 1 − δ(θi) the ﬁrm conceals and sends an
uninformative message, ∅.T h a ti s ,ﬁrm i’s information is veriﬁable. Denote ﬁrm i’s
realized disclosure D,w h e r eD ∈ {θi,∅}.
Finally, ﬁrms choose output levels of a homogeneous good (Cournot competition).
Firm i chooses output level xi ≥ 0 at cost θixi.F i r mn’s unit cost, C(D,κ),d e p e n d s
as follows on the technology disclosed by ﬁrm i.I f ﬁrm i discloses a low cost, then
part of this knowledge, κ, spills over to ﬁrm n. In all other cases, i.e. ﬁrm i discloses
a high cost or nothing, no useful knowledge spills over, i.e.
C(D,κ)=
½
κθ +( 1− κ)θ,i fD = θ,
θ, otherwise.
(2.1)
The inverse demand for the good is linear, i.e. P(X)=A − X,w i t hX ≡ x1 + x2.
Given cost θj, ﬁrm j’s expected proﬁti s :
πj(x;θj)=( A − θj − X)xj, (2.2)
with x ≡ (xi,x n) and j ∈ {i,n}. Firms are risk-neutral. I solve the game backwards,
i.e. I consider Bayes perfect equilibria.
3 Precommitment Regimes
In this section I study two standard disclosure regimes. In the ﬁrst regime ﬁrm i pre-
commits to disclose its information θi. In the second regime the innovative ﬁrm pre-
commits to conceal its information. Such ex ante precommitment could be obtained
through the establishment of a trade association or the organization of frequent trade
fares.
3.1 Full Disclosure
When ﬁrm i precommits to disclose its marginal cost, i.e. (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (1,1), ﬁrms
base their supply decision on their relative costs. The ﬁrst order conditions of each









(A − C(θi,κ) − xi). (3.2)












(A − 2C(θi,κ)+θi), (3.4)
and equilibrium proﬁt πd
j(θi;κ)=xd
j(θi;κ)2,w i t hθi ∈ {θ,θ} and j ∈ {i,n}.
First, if no knowledge spills over, κ =0 ,t h e nC(θi;0)=θ for any θi.T h ee x t r e m e
case of zero knowledge spillover would be relevant in industries where ﬁrm n is not
a l l o w e d( e . g .t h r o u g hp e r f e c ta n di n ﬁnitely strong intellectual property rights), or not
able (e.g. due to a lack of technological expertise) to imitate the eﬃcient technology θ.
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Figure 1: Full Disclosure Output (κ =0 )
best response curve, as in (3.2). The curve xi(xn;θi) is the best response curve of ﬁrm
7i with cost θi for θi ∈ {θ,θ}, as in (3.1). A reduction of ﬁrm i’s cost shifts ﬁrm i’s best
response curve outwards. That is, for any given output xn ﬁrm i supplies relatively
more of the good if it is eﬃcient. Hence, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium outputs decrease in
its cost, θi,w h i l eﬁrm n’s output increases in θi. In other words, outputs can be




i(θ;0). The output changes after
a reduction of θi are illustrated in Figure 1 by moving from point A to B.
Second, if all knowledge spills over from the innovative ﬁrm to its competitor,
κ =1 , ﬁrm n’s cost reduces to: C(θi,1) = θi. This extreme case would emerge if
no intellectual property rights exist and ﬁrm n can imitate the eﬃcient technology at
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Figure 2: Full Disclosure Output (κ =1 )
the best response curve of ﬁrm i with cost θi. A cost reduction for ﬁrm i now shift out
the best response curves of both ﬁrms. Firm n’s best response curve shifts out from
xn(xi;θ) to xn(xi;θ) after disclosure of θi = θ through the knowledge spillover. Notice
that this case is identical to a model where ﬁrms have a common cost parameter. The
equilibrium outputs are symmetric, since ﬁrms have identical costs, and ﬁrms supply
more output when they are eﬃcient, i.e. xd
j(θ;1)>x d
j(θ;1)for j ∈ {i,n}. This output
expansion is illustrated by moving from point A to point B0 in Figure 2.
8Finally, in the intermediate cases, with spillover 0 < κ < 1, I obtain the following
comparative statics results. An increase of the knowledge spillover shifts ﬁrm n’s best
response curve outwards (to the right) after ﬁrm i discloses θ. Hence, an increase of
the knowledge spillover increases ﬁrm n’s equilibrium output, ∂xd
n(θ;κ)/∂κ > 0,a n d
decreases ﬁrm i’s output, ∂xd
i(θ;κ)/∂κ < 0. These comparative statics results have
consequences for later analyses.
3.2 Full Concealment
When ﬁrm i precommits to conceal all its information, i.e. (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (0,0),t h e n
no information spills over to ﬁrm n,a n dC(∅,κ)=θ for any κ. Firms choose their
output levels such that ﬁrm i’s best response is as in (3.1) for θi ∈ {θ,θ},a n dﬁrm





A − θ − E {xi(θi)}
¢
. (3.5)



















A − 2θ + E {θi}
¢
, (3.7)
with θi ∈ {θ,θ}. The equilibrium outputs are illustrated in Figure 3 below. As in
the previous subsection, xn(xi;θ) and xi(xn;θi) are the best response curves of ﬁrm
n and ﬁrm i with cost θi, respectively. The curve E[xi(xn;θi)] gives the expected
best response of ﬁrm i to any output chosen by ﬁrm n. The intersection of ﬁrm n’s
best response curve with ﬁrm i’s expected best response gives ﬁrm n’s equilibrium
output xo
n. The best response of ﬁrm i with cost θi to output xo
n is ﬁrm i’s equilibrium
output xo










i(θ).F i r mn expects a relatively more eﬃcient competitor, and
therefore sets the lowest output. The equilibrium outputs are such that point D (C)
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Figure 3: Full Concealment Output
If no knowledge spills over from the innovative ﬁrm to the competitor, then the










n.F o r a
positive spillover ﬁrm i’s expected output under full disclosure is smaller than under
full concealment, and the reverse holds for ﬁrm n. These observations are useful for
the proﬁt analysis in the next subsection.
3.3 ProﬁtC o m p a r i s o n
The ﬁrms’ equilibrium output levels determine the ﬁrms’ expected equilibrium proﬁts.
























respectively, with j ∈ {i,n}. The expected proﬁt under full disclosure is an increasing
function of the output levels under full disclosure, and outputs are monotonic in the
spillover. Consequently, the expected equilibrium proﬁts are monotonic functions of





10does not change sign for j ∈ {i,n}.I np a r t i c u l a r ,ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁti sd e c r e a s i n g
in the knowledge spillover, while ﬁrm n’s expected proﬁt is increasing in the spillover.
If no knowledge spills over from ﬁrm i to n (κ =0 ), the expected equilibrium
outputs under full disclosure and full concealment are identical. Consequently, the
comparison of expected proﬁts is similar to the comparison of the variances of the
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Figure 4: Precommitment Proﬁts (κ =0 )
t h ev a r i a n c eo fﬁrm n’s output is clearly greatest under full disclosure. Whereas the
variance of ﬁrm n’s output under full concealment is zero, the variance of ﬁrm n’s
output under full disclosure is greater than zero. Similarly, ﬁrm i’s output variance
is greatest under full disclosure, as suggested by Figure 4. Consequently, both ﬁrms
expect the highest proﬁts under full disclosure. That is, if ﬁrm i can precommit to
full disclosure, it will do so. This result is a special case of results by Fried (1984),
Gal-Or (1986), and Shapiro (1986). My contribution here is to illustrate the result
graphically in a simple model. Furthermore, I show below how this result changes by
the introduction of a knowledge spillover.
If all knowledge spills over (κ =1 ) after disclosure, then the ex ante proﬁtc o m p a r -
ison is determined by the comparison of equilibrium outputs. Figure 5 below combines
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Figure 5: Precommitment Proﬁts (κ =1 )
ineﬃcient, then ﬁrm i is perceived as less “aggressive” after disclosure of θi = θ.
Disclosure results in a higher output by ﬁrm n, and consequently a lower output by
ﬁrm i, than after concealment. For eﬃcient ﬁrm i the following trade-oﬀ emerges.
On the one hand, ﬁrm i’s expected best response curve after disclosure is above ﬁrm
i’s expected curve after concealment. Hence, after disclosure ﬁrm n expects a more
“aggressive” competitor, which gives it an incentive for output reduction. On the
other hand, disclosure of θi = θ makes ﬁrm n a more “aggressive” competitor since
all knowledge spills over, i.e. ﬁrm n’s best response function shifts outward after
disclosure. The former eﬀect gives ﬁrm i an incentive to expand its output, but the
latter eﬀect gives an incentive to reduce ﬁrm i’s output. The latter eﬀect outweighs
the former eﬀect, as illustrated in Figure 5. Hence, ﬁrm i supplies more, while ﬁrm n





n(θi;1) for any θi. Consequently, ﬁrm i has a higher expected proﬁt
under full concealment, whereas ﬁrm n has higher proﬁts under full disclosure.6




n(κ)/dκ > 0 for all κ.
12Finally, for intermediate knowledge spillovers, the proﬁt comparison is determined
by a trade-oﬀ between the eﬀects above. Using monotonicity and continuity of the
expected proﬁt functions, the proof of the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 1 A critical knowledge spillover, κ∗ with 0 < κ∗ < 1, exists such that
ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁti sg r e a t e s tu n d e rf u l ld i s c l o s u r ei ﬀ κ < κ∗,i . e . Πd
i(κ) T Πo
i
iﬀ κ S κ∗.M o r e o v e r ,ﬁrm n expects always greater proﬁts under full disclosure, i.e.
Πd
n(κ) > Πo
n for any κ.
This result qualiﬁes previous results in the literature on information sharing in
oligopoly, see e.g. Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1986), and Shapiro (1986). The innovative
ﬁrm’s incentive to precommit to share its information is robust to the introduction of
as u ﬃciently small knowledge spillover. But if the knowledge spillover grows beyond
ac r i t i c a lv a l u eκ∗,t h ei n n o v a t i v eﬁrm no longer has an incentive to precommit to
share its information.
4S t r a t e g i c D i s c l o s u r e
In the previous section ﬁrm i was able to precommit to disclosure rules. In this
section I characterize the innovative ﬁrm’s incentives to disclose its production cost
strategically. Subsequently, I study the eﬀects of strategic disclosure on the ﬁrms’
expected proﬁts.
4.1 Equilibrium Outputs
I derive the outputs given any disclosure rule (δ(θ),δ(θ)) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1],a n da n y
feasible, disclosed message, D ∈ {θ,θ,∅}.A f t e rﬁrm i discloses information θi each
ﬁrm supplies the full disclosure equilibrium output xd
j(θi;κ) for j ∈ {i,n}.I f ﬁrm i
conceals its information (D = ∅), then ﬁrm j has beliefs consistent with the disclosure
rule, and assigns probability q to facing an eﬃcient competitor, where:
q ≡
p(1 − δ(θ))
p(1 − δ(θ)) + (1 − p)(1 − δ(θ))
. (4.1)
13Hence, ﬁrm j’s posterior beliefs are such that his expectation of ﬁrm i’s marginal cost
is E{θi|∅} ≡ qθ +( 1− q)θ.
The derivation of the equilibrium outputs under information concealment is similar
to the derivation under full concealment, where E{xi(θi)} is replaced by E{xi(θi)|∅}.
That is, if ﬁrm i chooses a disclosure rule where δ(θ) 6= δ(θ), then information con-
cealment is informative to ﬁrm n.F i r mn therefore updates its beliefs about its com-
petitor’s marginal cost after concealment, which yields expected cost E{θi|∅}.A f t e r
an increase in δ(θ) it is more likely that a concealing ﬁrm has a high marginal cost,
and therefore posterior belief q decreases, i.e. ∂q/∂δ(θ) < 0 and ∂E{θi|∅}/∂δ(θ) > 0.
A decrease in the probability of disclosing a high marginal cost parameter, δ(θ),h a s




















A − 2θ + E {θi|∅}
¢
. (4.3)
An increase of disclosure probability δ(θ) increases the expected cost of ﬁrm i after
concealment, and consequently increases ﬁrm n’s output xs




In the previous subsection I characterized equilibrium outputs for any feasible dis-
closure rule. This subsection derives the disclosure rules which ﬁrm i chooses in
equilibrium.
First, I show that ﬁrm i never has an incentive to disclose a high marginal cost
θ, i.e. in equilibrium δ(θ)=0for any spillover κ. After concealment ﬁrm n expects
ﬁrm i to have a marginal cost lower or equal to θ,w h i c hm a k e sﬁrm n less or equally
“aggressive” as under disclosure of θ. Since outputs are strategic substitutes, ﬁrm i
therefore (weakly) prefers to conceal θi = θ.
In the remainder of this subsection I study the equilibrium disclosure strategy
of ﬁrm i with a low marginal cost, given that ﬁrm n anticipates disclosure rule
14(δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ,0),w i t h0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Clearly, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium disclosure strat-
egy is determined by the comparison of the proﬁt from disclosure and proﬁtf r o m
concealment.
First, suppose that ﬁrm n has beliefs consistent with disclosure of θ, i.e. q =0
and E{θi|∅} = θ.I f ﬁrm i conceals a low cost, then ﬁrm n expects that ﬁrm i is
ineﬃcient, and ﬁrm n chooses output xd
n(θ,κ).E ﬃcient ﬁrm i’s best response to this
output is to set output x∗
i ≡ xi(xd
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Figure 6: Incentive to Disclose
outputs are such that point E in the ﬁgure is reached. If ﬁrm i discloses a low cost
with probability one, then both ﬁrms supply their full disclosure outputs. Now, as
illustrated in Figure 6, a critical spillover, κ ∈ (0,1), exists such that for this spillover
ﬁrm n’s best response curve after disclosure of θ, i.e. xn(xi;C(θ,κ)), runs through
point E. For any spillover smaller or equal to κ the equilibrium after disclosure of θ
is on the line B-E, and disclosure yields an equilibrium output for ﬁrm i greater or
equal than x∗
i.S i n c eﬁrm i’s equilibrium proﬁt is increasing in its equilibrium output
level, disclosure of θ is more or equally proﬁtable than concealment for any knowledge
spillover below or equal to κ. For these spillover values disclosure of a low cost is an
equilibrium strategy. That is, for κ < κ the strategic eﬀect of disclosure outweighs
15the technology expropriation eﬀect, given beliefs consistent with full disclosure.
Second, suppose that ﬁrm n has beliefs consistent with full concealment, i.e. q = p
and E{θi|∅} = E{θi}.N o w ,i fﬁrm i conceals a low cost, both ﬁrms supply their full


























































H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H























Figure 7: Incentive to Conceal
other hand, point D will be reached after disclosure of a low cost, if the knowledge
spillover is such that ﬁrm n’s best response curve after disclosure, xn(xi;C(θ,κ)),r u n s
through point D. We deﬁne κ as the critical spillover value for which this happens,
where 0 < κ < 1. For all spillovers greater of equal than κ the equilibrium outputs
a f t e rd i s c l o s u r ea r eo nt h el i n eD - B 0. These equilibrium output levels are below or
equal to xo
i(θ) for ﬁrm i, and yield therefore proﬁts below or equal to the proﬁtf r o m
concealment. In other words, for all spillovers greater of equal than κ, concealment is
an equilibrium strategy for ﬁrm i.
Finally, it is clear from comparing Figures 6 and 7 that critical spillovers κ and
κ are such that κ < κ, since point D is clearly to the left of E, as is illustrated
in Figure 8 below. If κ < κ < κ, ﬁrm i may choose a partial disclosure rule in
equilibrium, i.e. (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗,0) with 0 < δ
∗ < 1.I fﬁrm n has beliefs consistent
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Figure 8: Incentive for Partial Disclosure
conceals its cost, then ﬁrm n chooses output level xs
n. Output xs
n is the output level
where ﬁrm n’s best response curve xn(xi;θ) crosses ﬁrm i’s expected best response
curve, given beliefs consistent with disclosure rule (δ
∗,0), i.e. E[xi(xn;θi)|∅].T h i s
output lies between the output levels under full concealment and full disclosure, i.e.
xo
n and xd
n(θ,κ) respectively, since expected best response curve E[xi(xn;θi)|∅] lies
between the expected best response curve given prior beliefs, E[xi(xn;θi)],a n dt h e
best response curve of ineﬃcient ﬁrm i, xi(xn;θ).E ﬃcient ﬁrm i’s best response to
xs
n is to supply xs
i(θ). This equilibrium is illustrated by point F in Figure 8. Notice
that point F lies between points D and E. Clearly, there exists one spillover value
κs between κ and κ such that ﬁrm n’s best response curve runs through point F,
and ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between disclosure and concealment. Such a posterior belief
and spillover value support the partial disclosure rule (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗,0) as an
equilibrium strategy.
An increase of δ
∗ implies that ﬁrm n expects a less eﬃcient competitor after con-
cealment, i.e. ﬁrm i’s expected best response curve E[xi(xn;θi)|∅] shifts downwards.
Firm n’s equilibrium output does therefore increase, and eﬃcient ﬁrm i’s output de-
creases. In other words, the equilibrium shifts to the right along line D-E in Figure
178. Only an equal shift to the right of ﬁrm n’s best response curve can maintain ﬁrm
i’s indiﬀerence between disclosure and concealment of θ. Hence, knowledge spillover
κs needs to increase after δ
∗ increases. In summary, the equilibrium partial disclosure
probability δ
∗ is increasing in the spillover κ.








respectively, and the equilibrium partial disclosure probability is as follows:
δ
∗(κ) ≡ 1 −
(1 − p)(1 − 2κ)
2pκ
. (4.5)
This completes the characterization of the strategic disclosure incentives, and yields
the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The critical spillover values κ and κ exist, as deﬁned in (4.4) i.e.
0 < κ < κ < 1,s u c ht h a tﬁrm i chooses the following disclosure rules in equilibrium:
(a) if κ < κ, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium disclosure rule is unique, and yields full disclosure;
(b)i fκ ≤ κ ≤ κ, three equilibrium disclosure rules exist, yielding either full disclosure,
full concealment, or partial disclosure (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗(κ),0) with δ
∗(κ) as in (4.5),
i.e. dδ
∗/dκ > 0, δ
∗(κ)=0 ,a n dδ
∗(κ)=1 ;
(c) if κ > κ, ﬁrm i’s equilibrium disclosure rule is unique, and yields full concealment.
This result illustrates that the unraveling result in Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) is
robust to the introduction of small knowledge spillovers. For suﬃciently high knowl-
edge spillovers (in particular, for κ > κ), however, the non-monotonicity of best
response functions creates suﬃciently strong incentives to conceal information, and
consequently the unraveling result fails.
4.3 ProﬁtC o m p a r i s o n
In this subsection I compare expected proﬁts under the equilibrium disclosure rules.
The expected proﬁts under full disclosure and no disclosure are already given in ex-
pressions (3.8) and (3.9), respectively. If the spillover is κs from Figure 8, the expected


























since, by construction, xd
i(θ;κs)=xs
i(θ) for equilibrium disclosure rule (δ
∗,0).
The comparison of ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt under full and partial disclosure reduces
to the comparison between xd
i(θ;κs) and xs
i(θ). In Figure 8 this comparison is between
points A and G, respectively. Clearly, point A yields a lower output for ﬁrm i than
point G, i.e. xd
i(θ;κs) <x s
i(θ), and consequently Πd
i(κs) < Πs
i(κs).T h ec o m p a r i s o n
of ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt under partial disclosure and full concealment is illustrated
by the comparison between points F and D, and points G and C in Figure 8. Both
comparisons yield the highest output levels for ﬁrm i under full concealment, i.e.
(D,C). Hence, ﬁrm i earns the greatest expected proﬁt under full concealment, i.e.
Πs
i(κs) < Πo
i. Clearly, a similar comparison emerges for any other spillover between




i for all κ < κ < κ.
Finally, the expected proﬁto fﬁrm n given partial disclosure by ﬁrm i and spillover




















n, as illustrated in Figure 8 (point F). The comparison of expected
proﬁts under full disclosure and partial disclosure is essentially a comparison between
xd
n(θ;κs) and xd
n(θ;κs), or points A and G, respectively. Under full disclosure ﬁrm n
has a higher expected proﬁt (i.e. point A is to the right of G in Figure 8). Firm n’s
output level under full concealment is below its output level under partial disclosure
(e.g. point C is to the left of point G in Figure 8), and therefore ﬁrm n earns




n(κ) for all κ < κ < κ. Is t a t et h i sf o r m a l l yi nt h ef o l l o w i n g
proposition.
19Proposition 3 For knowledge spillover κ ∈ (κ,κ),w i t hκ and κ as in (4.4), the ﬁrms’
expected equilibrium proﬁts under partial disclosure (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗,0),w i t hδ
∗ as in








An immediate implication of the analysis of ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁts above, and
monotonicity and continuity of the expected proﬁt functions, is that the critical value
κ∗ from Proposition 1 is below κ. This result is illustrated in Figure 7. For spillover
κ = κ ﬁrm i’s ex ante expected proﬁt from concealment is greater than the expected
proﬁt from disclosure. By construction, an eﬃcient ﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between dis-
closure and concealment. But an ineﬃcient ﬁrm i makes a greater proﬁt after conceal-
ment, since its output after concealment is greatest (i.e. xo
i(θ) >x d
i(θ;κ) as illustrated
in e.g. Figure 7). Since Πd
i(κ) is decreasing in κ,a n dΠo
i > Πd
i(κ),c r i t i c a lv a l u eκ∗
must be below κ,a si ss t a t e db e l o w .
Corollary 1 Critical values κ∗, κ and κ, from propositions 1 and 2 are such that:
κ∗ < κ < κ.
Intuitively, this result is due to the fact that under strategic disclosure an eﬃcient
ﬁrm ignores the negative externality that its disclosure choice inﬂicts on its ineﬃcient
counterpart. Under precommitment the innovative ﬁrm internalizes this externality,
which reduces the ﬁrm’s incentive to disclose a low cost.
An implication of Propositions 1 and 2, and the corollary is that if ﬁrm i precom-
mits, it conceals its information for more knowledge spillover values than if it discloses
strategically. In particular, for spillovers κ∗ < κ < κ the ﬁrm prefers to precommit
to full concealment (see Proposition 1), while it strategically discloses its information
in the unique disclosure equilibrium (see Proposition 2). In the next section I discuss
some economic policy implications of this observation.
205A n t i t r u s t A n a l y s i s
Should an antitrust authority prohibit an innovative ﬁr mt op r e c o m m i tt od i s c l o s ei t s
process innovation, or should precommitment be encouraged? I address this question
here.
First, I discuss the eﬀects of information disclosure on the expected consumers’
surplus. If the innovative ﬁrm’s technology cannot be expropriated, i.e. κ =0 ,t h e n
the consumers’ surplus is greatest under full disclosure. For example, Shapiro (1986)
shows this formally, and Kühn and Vives (1995) give a graphical illustration. An
increase of the knowledge spillover reduces the expected equilibrium price under full
disclosure, since imitation reduces the expected cost of ﬁrm n. The expected price
reduction increases the expected consumers’ surplus under full disclosure, i.e. the
expected consumers’ surplus under full disclosure is increasing in spillover κ. Clearly,
the consumers’ surplus under full concealment does not depend on the spillover. If
the spillover equals κ as in (4.4), then the consumers’ surplus under full disclosure
is greater than the consumers’ surplus under full concealment. Consequently, due to
continuity and monotonicity of the consumers’ surplus, there exists a critical value κc
with 0 < κc < κ such that for all spillovers greater than κc the consumers’ surplus
is highest under full disclosure. Hence, if the antitrust authority maximizes exclu-
sively the consumers’ surplus, she should prohibit precommitment for all κ ≥ κc.I n
particular, if κc ≤ κ∗, then precommitment should always be prohibited.
Second, if an antitrust authority maximizes social welfare, i.e. the sum of the
consumers’ surplus and the industry proﬁts, then the following trade-oﬀse m e r g ef o r
extreme spillover values. If κ =0 , expected industry proﬁts are greatest but expected
consumers’ surplus is smallest under full disclosure. As e.g. Shapiro (1986) shows,
expected welfare is highest under full disclosure, i.e. the proﬁte ﬀect outweighs the
consumers’ surplus eﬀect. Conversely, if κ =1 , then full disclosure yields a higher
expected consumers’ surplus and expected proﬁto fﬁrm n, but a lower expected proﬁt
for ﬁrm i. Although the trade-oﬀ diﬀers from the one I had before, expected welfare
remains greatest under full disclosure. For intermediate knowledge spillovers an in-
21crease of spillover κ creates the following trade-oﬀ for antitrust authority under full
disclosure. On the one hand, ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt decreases, but, on the other
hand, both the expected consumers’ surplus and ﬁrm n’s expected proﬁti n c r e a s e .
Finally, it is easy to show that if demand is suﬃciently strong (i.e. the intercept
A is suﬃciently great), then the expected welfare is increasing in κ. Consequently,
if demand is suﬃciently strong, then expected welfare is greatest under full disclo-
sure, and a welfare-maximizing antitrust authority should prohibit precommitment to
communication between ﬁrms.
I state and prove these results formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (a) The critical value κc exists, with 0 < κc < κ,a n dκ as in (4.4),
such that for all κ ≥ κc the expected consumers’ surplus is highest under prohibition
of precommitment. (b) If A>1
4(11θ − 7θ), then expected social welfare is highest
under prohibition of precommitment.
The previous discussion suggests that an antitrust authority should prohibit the
ﬁrms to precommit to information sharing rules in many relevant cases. The prohibi-
tion of precommitment may have an additional advantage, since it may also help the
antitrust authority to ﬁght collusion.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I analyzed the eﬀects of disclosure regulation and knowledge spillovers on
disclosure incentives and product market competition. The analysis was conducted
for industries where ﬁrms are Cournot competitors, and where the innovative ﬁrm
makes announcements about a process innovation.
I have shown that disclosure regulation substantially aﬀects ﬁrms’ outputs and
proﬁts for intermediate values of the knowledge spillover. For these knowledge spillover
values a strategic innovative ﬁrm discloses its technology in more cases than a precom-
mitted ﬁrm. The precommitted ﬁrm has a lower incentive to disclose its technology
since the ﬁrm internalizes a negative externality that the disclosure of an eﬃcient
22technology inﬂicts on the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm with an ineﬃcient technology. An an-
titrust authority can use disclosure regulation to exploit the eﬀect of this externality
on the ﬁrms’ product market conduct. Prohibiting the innovative ﬁrm to precommit
to information sharing rules yields more (strategic) technology disclosure, and thereby
potentially a higher consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
For extreme spillover values, i.e. when only very little or most of the disclosed tech-
nology can be expropriated, disclosure regulation does not aﬀect the ﬁrms’ conduct.
In both cases, however, the prohibition of precommitment can have the additional
advantage of helping to ﬁght collusion between ﬁrms.
A Appendix
T h i sA p p e n d i xc o n t a i n sp r o o f so fp r o p o s i t i o n s2 ,3 ,a n d4 .
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
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The comparison of proﬁts πs
i(θ|θ) and πs
i(∅|θ) yields the following immediate obser-
vations.
Full disclosure, (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (1,0),i so p t i m a li fπs
i(θ|θ) > πs
i(∅|θ) or κ < 1
2(1−q).
Firm n’s posterior belief is consistent with full disclosure if q =0 . Hence, full disclo-
sure is an equilibrium strategy for all κ < κ. On the other hand, full concealment,
(δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (0,0), is optimal if πs
i(θ|θ) < πs
i(∅|θ) or κ > 1
2(1 − q). The posterior
belief consistent with full concealment is q = p. Therefore, full concealment is an
23equilibrium disclosure rule for all κ > κ. Finally, a partial disclosure rule exists in
equilibrium, i.e. (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗,0) with 0 < δ
∗ < 1,i fﬁrm i is indiﬀerent between
disclosure and concealment, given posterior beliefs consistent with partial disclosure.
Indiﬀerence emerges if κ = 1
2(1 − q).U s i n g d e ﬁnition (4.1), it is straightforward to









which yields equilibrium probability δ
∗(κ) in (4.5). Clearly, this partial disclosure
equilibrium exists for spillovers such that κ < κ < κ, and the partial disclosure
probability δ
∗ is increasing in κ. This completes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Firm i’s expected proﬁt under partial disclosure is decreasing in the knowledge spillover,
























Furthermore, if κ = κ,a sd e ﬁned in proposition 2, then δ
∗ =0 ,a n dΠo
i = Πs
i(κ).S i n c e
Πo
i is constant while Πs
i(κ) is decreasing in κ, it follows immediately that Πo
i > Πs
i(κ)
for all κ < κ ≤ κ,w i t hκ and κ as deﬁn e di np r o p o s i t i o n2 .T h ec o m p a r i s o no ft h e




i(κ). For lower spillover values the comparison between ﬁrm i’s
expected proﬁt under full disclosure (3.8) with j = i, and the expected proﬁtu n d e r
partial disclosure (4.6) reduces to the comparison of xd
i(θ;κ) and xs
i(θ), respectively.





















Io b t a i nΠs
i(κ) > Πd
i(κ) for all κ ≤ κ < κ. Hence, the innovative ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts




i for all κ < κ < κ.
Finally, ﬁrm n’s expected proﬁt under partial disclosure (δ(θ),δ(θ)) = (δ
∗,0) is


















24Moreover, if κ = κ,t h e nδ
∗ =0 ,a n dΠo
n = Πs
n(κ).S i n c eΠo
n is constant while Πs
n(κ)
is increasing in κ, it follows immediately that Πo
n(κ) < Πs
n(κ) for all κ < κ ≤ κ.O n
the other hand, if κ = κ,t h e nδ
∗ =1and Πs
n(κ)=Πd
n(κ).F o rκ < κ the comparison
between ﬁrm n’s expected proﬁt under full disclosure (3.8) with j = n, and partial
disclosure (4.7) is essentially a comparison between outputs xd
n(θ;κ) and xd
n(θ;κ),













for all κ < κ. Hence, Πs
n(κ) < Πd




n(κ) for all κ < κ < κ. This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
For a given industry output X the consumers’ surplus equals 1
2X2.S o c i a lw e l f a r ei s
the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the total proﬁts, i.e. W ≡ 1
2X2 + πi + πn.





(2A − θi − C(θi,κ)). (A.8)












(a) First, notice that the consumers’ surplus under full disclosure is increasing in
spillover κ: ∂E{1
2Xd(θi;κ)2}/∂κ = pXd(θ;κ)·∂Xd(θ;κ)/∂κ > 0,s i n c e∂Xd(θ;κ)/∂κ >
0 as follows from (A.8). For κ = κ(= 1
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while Xd(θ;κ) >X o(θ). Hence, E{Xd(θi;κ)2} >E {Xo(θi)2}. Continuity and mono-
tonicity of the consumers’ surplus immediately yield the existence of a critical value
κc with 0 < κc < κ such that for all κ ≥ κc the consumers’ surplus is highest under
full disclosure.
25(b) A ss h o w ni ne . g . S h a p i r o( 1 9 8 6 )E{Wd(θi;κ)} >E {Wo(θi)} for κ =0 .T h e
























(θ − θ)[4A +7 θ − 11C(θ,κ)],
which is positive for all κ if A>1
4(11θ − 7θ). Consequently, if A>1
4(11θ − 7θ),
E{Wd(θi;κ)} >E {Wo(θi)} for all κ. This completes the proof.
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